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Abstract
Standard benefit-cost analysis often ignores distortions caused by taxation and
the heterogeneity of taxpayers. In this paper, we theoretically and numerically
explore the effect of imperfect taxation on the public provision of mortality risk
reductions (or public safety). We show that this effect critically depends on the
source of imperfection as well as on the individual utility and survival probability
functions. Our simulations based on the calibration of distributional weights and
applied to the COVID-19 example suggest that the value per statistical life, and
in turn the optimal level of public safety, should be adjusted downwards because
of imperfect taxation. However, we also identify circumstances under which this
result is reversed, so that imperfect taxation cannot generically justify less public
safety.
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Mortality reduction represents a significant part of the benefit of many environmental
projects. For instance, it has been estimated to account for more than 90% of the mon-
etized benefit of the Clean Air Act (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2011). A
standard practice to evaluate this benefit is to use benefit cost analysis (BCA) based
on the willingness to pay approach. In the context of the evaluation of a mortality risk
reduction project, this amounts to using the value of statistical life (VSL) approach.1
Importantly, BCA and thus the VSL approach traditionally assumes that the financing
of a project is “perfect” in the sense that taxation optimally accounts for the hetero-
geneity of taxpayers, and does not create distortions such as labor supply distortions. In
this paper, we relax this assumption and examine how the imperfections of the taxation
system affect the optimal level of public safety, and in turn whether adjustments in the
standard VSL approach are warranted.
Accounting for imperfect taxation in the evaluation of mortality reduction benefits in
public safety projects is important for several reasons. First, it is well documented that
the taxation system is imperfect in both developed and developing countries and that the
degree of imperfection varies widely across the world (Tanzi and Zee 2001).2 Second, from
a policy perspective, various guidelines encourage policy evaluations to also include in
BCA “distributive impacts”, “equity”, or “environmental justice” (European Commission
2009; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2016a). But it is also well known that
concrete methodologies for evaluating such additional impacts remain undeveloped (Adler
2008). Moreover, safety issues usually raise strong equity concerns that call for a careful
and systematic analysis of distributive impacts, as illustrated by the economic policy
discussions about the COVID-19 pandemic (Adler 2020). Third, the literature in public
economics has long debated in general settings the issue of the optimal provision of public
goods under distortionary taxes and individual heterogeneities (Atkinson and Stiglitz
1980). It thus seems useful to examine a specific but important domain of application
such as public safety provision. A starting point to do so is to develop a comparative
1Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines recommend using a VSL of $9.7 million in 2013
U.S dollars (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2010). In 2016, the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) uses a VSL of $9.6 million for their analyses (U.S. Department of Transportation
2016).
2For example, according to OECD (2017), Hungary still implements a flat income tax system, whereas
other OECD countries implement a progressive tax system.
2
statics analysis of the effect of taxation system imperfections on the optimal level of
public safety.
In our analysis, we proceed as follows. We compare the optimal level of public safety
selected by a utilitarian social planner under three exogenous benchmark types of the
taxation system: individual lump-sum tax (first-best), uniform lump-sum tax (uniform
tax) and uniform flat tax (income tax).3 We consider in turn two types of individual
heterogeneity, namely wealth and mortality risk heterogeneity, and we also consider dis-
tortionary taxation. Our primary results are the following. Under wealth heterogeneity,
compared with the first-best level of public safety, we show that the optimal level of
public safety provision is usually lower under uniform taxation, but that it can be greater
under income taxation. Under mortality risk heterogeneity, the comparison is generally
ambiguous, as it typically depends on whether the heterogeneity concerns the baseline
risk or the reduction in risk. Finally, we show that under reasonable assumptions on labor
supply and the shape of the utility function, public safety under first-best is generally
higher compared to distortionary taxation.
From this theoretical analysis, we conclude that the imperfection of the taxation
system cannot generically justify more or less public safety provision. The basic intuition
is simple. Take the wealth heterogeneity case for example. Under perfect taxation, the
rich are taxed more than the poor. Imperfect taxation shifts some of the tax burden
from the rich to the poor. Thus, the rich are relatively richer and would prefer more
public safety, whereas the poor are relatively poorer and would prefer less public safety.
Depending on the shape of the utility function, the demand for safety of the rich may, or
may not, over shadow that of the poor, so that more or less safety should be provided.
Hence, the answer about which effect dominates is essentially empirical.
At the end of the paper, we discuss some policy implications. In particular, we
develop some simulation exercises based on the calibration of distributional weights using
data from the U.S. population. These simulations indicate that the VSL, and in turn
the optimal level of public safety, should be significantly adjusted downwards because
of imperfect taxation. For instance, in our illustrative analysis of the COVID-19 early
prevention policy, the induced weighted VSL should be reduced by about one-third under
3In the optimal taxation literature, endogenous taxation is typically studied to account for the issue
of imperfect information (Mirrlees 1971). In our setting, we assume for simplicity that the tax system is
exogenously given.
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uniform taxation compared to the first-best case.
Our paper builds on two strands of literature: the VSL and the optimal provision of
public good literature. First, the VSL represents the individual’s marginal willingness
to pay for a small reduction in mortality risk (Drèze 1962; Jones-Lee 1974). The VSL
literature has examined both theoretically and empirically how VSL varies with the char-
acteristics of individuals or of the decision-making environment (Andersson and Treich
2011; Viscusi and Aldy 2003). However, the vast majority of this literature has ignored
the issue of imperfect taxation, with two notable exceptions. Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996)
study the optimal allocation of safety among heterogeneous individuals under uniform
taxation.4 Armantier and Treich (2004) examine the bias induced by the standard VSL
approach under uniform taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in wealth and mor-
tality risk. However, these two papers do not compare the impact of various taxation
systems. Moreover, they do not consider labor supply distortions.
Second, in the public good provision literature, a standard reference is the Pigou
conjecture. Pigou (1947) states that, under distortionary taxation, the marginal benefit
of the public good should be greater than the marginal production cost, implying a lower
provision of the public good.5 This conjecture led to the development of the marginal cost
of public funds (MCPF) concept, which was first incorporated into Samuelson’s rule for
the optimal public good provision by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974). If Pigou’s conjecture holds, the value of MCPF
should be greater than 1. However, the literature has shown that this conjecture holds
only under specific settings and that the value of the MCPF depends on the relationship
between the public good, labor supply, and the taxed activities (Atkinson and Stern
1974; Ballard and Fullerton 1992; Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971). Gaube (2000) shows for
instance that with heterogeneous households, equity considerations may increase public
expenditure in the second-best. In practice, BCA typically recommends using an MCPF
larger than one to account for imperfect taxation, which seems questionable given the
4Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) focus on the collectively purchased risk reduction that can be targeted
at different individuals. Under uniform taxation, they study the optimal individual safety level, whereas
we study the optimal public safety (i.e. individuals consume the same amount of safety).
5Pigou (1947, p.33-34) noted: “Where there is indirect damage, it ought to be added to the direct
loss of satisfaction involved in the withdrawal of the marginal unit of resources by taxation, before this
is balanced against the satisfaction yielded by the marginal expenditure. It follows that, in general,
expenditure ought not to be carried so far as to make the real yield of the last unit of resources expended
by the government equal to the real yield of the last unit left in the hands of the representative citizen.”
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lack of consensus in the literature. Although the MCPF has been extensively studied, we
are not aware of any specific application to public safety.
Moreover, most of the literature in public economics examines the level and properties
of optimal public good provision under a specific taxation system, but does not compare
various systems. Thus, we contribute to this literature by considering a public safety
setting, and by developing a comparative statics analysis of different taxation systems.
Before proceeding further with the model, we want to stress two strong limitations.
The first is that the model is most directly applicable to government-funded public safety
programs that are financed by taxes. We have in mind for instance public clean-up pro-
grams (such as those concerning sites contaminated with hazardous substances), infras-
tructure investments (such as those improving transport safety or reducing flood risks),
water sanitation, R&D research in health, or nuclear wastes management. However,
in reality, many public safety programs are based on regulations that impose costs on
private firms and households. Our model is not directly relevant to this latter form of reg-
ulation that would typically require a precise modeling of the polluting industry market
structure and of the households’ demand for the goods produced by that industry.6 The
second important limitation is that the model is static. However, many mortality risks
are long term risks which affect the dynamics of private decisions such as self-protection,
insurance demand, borrowing and savings (Shepard and Zeckhauser 1984). Moreover,
the optimal fiscal policy is better conceived in a dynamic setting (Motta and Rossi 2019;
Werning 2007). Here, we abstract from the various complexities induced by a dynamic
model with a sequence of public intervention and individual decisions, including that of
time-inconsistency.
2 The Model
In this section, we set up the benchmark first-best model of optimal public safety provi-
sion. We consider a single period economy with H individuals that differ only in wealth
wi and mortality risk 1 − pi (i = 1, ..., H). We assume that the utility function is uni-
form across individuals and the bequest motive is normalized to zero. Following the VSL
6However, we note that we include a numerical exploration of the COVID-19 prevention policy (see
7.2), which may be somehow informative about the impact of a safety program that imposes large costs
on firms and households. This numerical exercise was made possible because we could rely on existing
papers that estimate the cost of public safety in terms of the global loss in GDP.
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literature, the individual i’s expected utility is given by
EUi = pi(G)u(ci, li) (2.1)
Here pi(G) denotes the probability of survival given the level of public expenditure on
safety G. u(·) is the individual’s survival utility as a function of her consumption level ci
and labor supply li. Under an exogenous wage rate ωi, individual i has wealth wi ≡ ωili
and when the individual faces a tax rate ti, the consumption level is ci = ωili − ti. We
assume that the tax is collected ex ante when everyone is alive and before knowing who
will die.7
In this model, the utility function is assumed to be strictly positive (u > 0), since the
bequest motive is normalized to zero and survival is assumed to be strictly preferred to
death.8 The utility function is increasing and concave in the consumption level (uc > 0,
ucc < 0), and decreasing and concave in labor supply (ul < 0, ull < 0). The survival
function is positive, increasing, and weakly concave (pi(·) > 0, p′i(·) > 0, p′′i (·) ≤ 0), and
pi(G) < 1 for all is.
In the first-best, the utilitarian social planner chooses the optimal level of public safety
G and the lump-sum tax rate ti (a subsidy is a negative tax) for each individual i by
maximizing social welfare and taking into account the individual optimal labor supply
response for a given level of ti. As the tax levied on each individual is lump-sum, the





= ωi, where u∗c ≡ uc(c∗i (ti), l∗i (ti)) and u∗l ≡ ul(c∗i (ti), l∗i (ti)).9 Therefore, the social
7This assumption is a shortcut for a more complex model, where all living individuals today finance
public safety expenditures, but these individuals will die at different times in the future. Here, in our
one-period model, there are only two possibilities, either the individual survives the period and can enjoy
the consumption of his income, or he dies (and his utility is normalized to zero and thus independent of
income).
8In a special case, the possibility of a bequest motive v(ci, li) can also be considered, with EUi =
pi(G)u(ci, li)+ (1− pi(G)v(ci, li). As is common in the literature, assume v(ci, li) = ku(ci, li) for some k
(k ∈ [0, 1) for u > 0 and k > 1 for u < 0) (Kaplow 2005; Viscusi and Evans 1990). This means that the
utility in the death state is proportionally lower than the survival utility. Therefore, for each individual,
we can write πi(G) = k + (1 − k)pi(G), πi(·) > 0, π′i(·) > 0, π′′i (·) ≤ 0, and EUi = πi(G)u(ci, li). It is
straightforward that all results of the paper carry out under this particular case.
9This can be obtained by solving maxci,li u(ci, li) s.t. ci = wili − ti for all i.
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where µ denotes the shadow price of one additional unit of public safety.10 Assuming
interior solutions, the system of focs has a unique set of solutions denoted by t∗i and
G∗. The focs indicate that the social planner equalizes the expected marginal utility of
consumption across individuals.




∗)V SLi = 1 (2.6)
where V SLi ≡
u∗
pi(G∗)u∗c




i . V SLi is the VSL
of individual i, which describes the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between wealth
and survival probability. The VSL term exhibits two standard effects, namely the dead-
anyway effect and the wealth effect. The dead-anyway effect states that VSL decreases
10We will assume throughout that the second order conditions hold globally. See appendix A.1 for
more details.
7
in the survival probability pi, i.e., the individual facing higher risks has the incentive to
increase his spending on risk reduction (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996). The wealth effect
states that VSL increases in the individual’s disposable wealth ci.
Equation 2.6 characterizes the efficiency condition to achieve the optimal level of
public safety provision. It corresponds to Samuelson’s condition of equalizing social
marginal benefit to the social marginal cost of providing for the public good (Samuelson
1954).
In the following, we relax the assumption of perfect taxation. Moreover, we want to
the compare optimal public safety level under first and second-best taxation. Because
this comparison is very difficult in a general setting, we consider two simple alternative
taxation schemes, uniform and income taxation. Moreover, we carry out the analyses
with one variation at a time.11 We examine in section 3 and 4 the case of imperfect
redistribution between heterogeneous individuals with exogenous labor supply. In that
case, we denote without loss of generality that u(ci) ≡ u(ci, li). To illustrate the analysis,
two common utility forms are used, namely constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility: with CRRA utility, u(c) = c1−γ
1−γ , γ ∈
(0, 1); with CARA utility, u(c) = 1−e−αc
α
, α > 0.12 Two analytically important coefficients
are relative risk aversion R(c) = −cu
′′(c)
u′(c)
and the fear of ruin FR(c) = u(c)
u′(c)
(Foncel and
Treich 2005). The only class of utility function that has linear fear of ruin is CRRA,
which also has R(c) = γ. In section 5, we study the case of labor effort distortion with
income taxes on identical individuals with utilities u(c, l).
3 Wealth Heterogeneity
In this section, we examine the case of individual heterogeneity in wealth only. We assume
that the labor supply is exogenously determined (or consider wealth in the form of an
endowment) and the survival probabilities are homogeneous across individuals. In the
first-best, tax ti is levied on individual i. Deviating from the first-best, we consider two
cases: uniform tax tU and income tax τwi. Thus, the social planner solves the following
11We thus do not explore theoretically the global impact of all individual heterogeneities combined.
Although we partially address this in the simulations, we do not explore the impact of possible correlations
among wealth and risk. It is well documented for instance that wealthier individuals are usually less
exposed to risks. We leave this for future research.
12Note that because we assume u > 0, we impose γ < 1 and α > 0. This assumption restricts the class
of CRRA and CARA utility functions that we consider in this paper.
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The focs 3.4 imply wi− t∗i = wj− t∗j ∀i, j ∈ {1, .., H}. Assuming wi > wj, we can infer
that t∗i > t∗j . Thus under wealth heterogeneity, the first-best requires a higher tax on the
wealthier individual. In the remainder of this section, we separately compare first-best
G∗F with uniform tax G∗U and with income tax G∗I .
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3.1 First-best and uniform tax comparison
Proposition 1. Under wealth heterogeneity with homogeneous risk and exogenous labor
supply, with u′′′(x) ≥ 0, the optimal level of public safety in the first-best is higher than
that with uniform taxation (G∗F > G∗U).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 shows that, under the common assumption of prudence (Kimball 1990),
where the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing at a diminishing rate, the optimal
level of public safety in the first-best is higher than that under uniform tax.
The intuition for this result is illustrated in Figure 1. In the first-best, the social
planner equalizes the individual marginal utilities. When perfect taxation is not possible,
the marginal utility cannot be equalized which affects both the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of safety provision. Comparing to the first-best, uniform taxation decreases
the marginal benefit of safety for any given level of safety due to the unequal distribution
of after-tax wealth under risk aversion. In other words, saving a life has less value
on average because imperfect taxation lowers the average utility in the society. Uniform
taxation also increases the marginal cost of safety provision because the average marginal
utility of consumption is higher (under prudence) due to sub-optimal financing. This is
consistent with the Pigou conjecture. Combining the two effects, less safety is provided
under uniform taxation than in the first-best.
























To illustrate the result with a specific and extreme example, consider two individuals
with wealth 1000 and 10 respectively. They both have the same CRRA utility u(c) = c0.5
0.5
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and survival function p(G) = a + (1 − a)(1 − e−(1−a)G) with a = 0.8. In the first best,
the rich is taxed 505.9, and the poor is given a subsidy of 484.1. Therefore, the total
investment in public safety is 21.8. Under uniform taxation, each is taxed 5.9, and the
total investment on public safety is now 11.8, which is about one-half of the level of safety
in the first-best.
3.2 First-best and income tax comparison
Remark 1. Under wealth heterogeneity with homogeneous risk and exogenous labor sup-
ply, the optimal level of public safety in the first-best could be above, below or equal to the
level under income tax.
We illustrate Remark 1 with the case of two individuals. Table 1 presents simulations
of the optimal public safety provision under three specific cases with CRRA and CARA
utility. With CRRA utility, the optimal level is the same under first-best and income
tax. With CARA utility, the level of provision may be higher or lower in first-best than
with income tax given the degree of risk aversion (parameter α in the utility function).
Table 1 Simulations of the optimal public safety under wealth heterogeneity
Utility CRRA CARA
Parameter value γ = 0.5 α = 0.02 α = 0.001
Tax Rate
t1 794.6 1047.5 794.1
t2 -705.3 -452.6 -705.9












Note: Simulated in Mathematica. p(G) = a + (1 − a)(1 − e−0.3(1−a)G) with a = 0.9, CRRA utility
u(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ , CARA utility u(x) =
1−e−αx
α , w1 = 2000 and w2 = 500.
In the following, we further study the case of CRRA utility.
Remark 2. Under wealth heterogeneity with homogeneous risk and exogenous labor sup-
ply, if the utility function satisfies CRRA, then the optimal level of public safety in the
first-best is always the same as that with income taxation (G∗F = G∗I).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The linear fear of ruin property of CRRA utility is instrumental to this result. Notice





that only the sum of wealth matters for determining the optimal level of public safety.
Therefore, if the sum of wealth remains the same, optimal level of public safety would
always coincide in the first-best and in income tax, regardless of how the wealth is dis-
tributed.
4 Mortality Risk Heterogeneity
In this section, we consider individual heterogeneity on survival probability pi(G) (or risk
heterogeneity 1 − pi(G)), with homogeneous wealth and exogenous labor supply. As we
will see, the comparison depends on the specification of the survival probability function,
and the results are thus not generic. We therefore present results as “remarks” in this
section, and restrict to the case of H = 2 to facilitate the exposition. Without loss of





p1(GF )u(w − t1) + p2(GF )u(w − t2)





(p1(GU) + p2(GU))u(w − tU)





(p1(GI) + p2(GI))u(w(1− τ))
s.t. GI = 2τw
(4.3)
Note that income tax is equivalent to uniform tax in this scenario as there is no hetero-
geneity in wealth. Indeed, one can always set τ = tU
w
to have w(1 − τ) = w − tU and
obtain GI = GU . Therefore, we focus the analysis on the uniform tax case.
We show in Appendix A.4 that the ranking of G∗F and G∗U depends on the shape
of the fear of ruin ( u
u′














this relationship, it is important to identify where the risk heterogeneity arises. The
risk heterogeneity may come from two sources: baseline risk and risk reduction. More
specifically, baseline risk refers to the individual risk prior to the implementation of the
public safety project, and risk reduction refers to the individual benefit from the project.
In the remainder of this section, we first separately analyze heterogeneous baseline risk
and heterogeneous risk reduction, and then we consider a proportional risk reduction
which implies that the two sources are correlated.
Heterogeneous Baseline Risk
With heterogeneous baseline risk, agents have different baseline survival probability
pi, but receive the same level of benefit from the public safety project ε(G). The survival
function could be expressed as pi(G) = pi + ε(G), with ε(·) < 1−max{p1, p2}, ε(·) > 0,
ε′(·) > 0, and ε′′(·) ≤ 0.
Remark 3. Under heterogeneous baseline risk (pi(G) = pi + ε(G)) with homogeneous
wealth and exogenous labor supply, if fear of ruin is weakly concave, the optimal level of
public safety is lower in the first-best than with uniform or income tax (G∗F < G∗U = G∗I).





























implies G∗F < G∗U = G∗I .
We show in Table 2 that if utility is CARA, for which fear of ruin is convex, the
optimal level of public safety can be greater or lower in the first-best than under uniform
or income tax.
Table 2 Simulation for heterogeneous baseline risk with CARA utility
Utility CARA




















The result displayed in Remark 3 goes in the opposite direction of the Pigou conjec-
ture. First-best equalizes the expected marginal utility of individuals by imposing a lower
13
tax on the less-exposed individual, i.e., one with higher baseline survival probability, and
a higher tax on the more-exposed individual, i.e., one with lower baseline survival prob-
ability. This is in line with the dead-anyway effect (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996). Under
uniform taxation and weakly concave fear of ruin, uniform taxation may exacerbate this
effect, which results in a higher public safety level.
Heterogeneous Risk Reduction
With heterogeneous risk reduction, agents have the same baseline survival probability
p, but have different degrees of benefit δi from the safety project. The survival function
is assumed to be linear in the public safety level, thus pi(G) = p+ δiG, δi < 1−pG for any
G.
Remark 4. Under heterogeneous linear risk reduction (pi(G) = p + δiG) with homoge-
neous wealth and exogenous labor supply, if fear of ruin is weakly convex, the optimal
level of safety provision in the first-best is higher than that with uniform or income tax
(G∗F > G∗U = G∗I).











. Thus, if fear
of ruin is weakly convex, G∗F > G∗U = G∗I .
Proportional risk reduction
The third case we look at is that of a proportional risk reduction, which implies a
correlation between the baseline risk and the risk change. It is well documented in the
environmental health literature that individuals with underlying health conditions are
often more susceptible to mortality risks from air pollution and thus may benefit more
from a regulatory intervention that reduces those risks (Goldberg et al. 2013; Pope III
et al. 2015). Here we consider a standard proportional hazards model of risk wherein
exposure to a pollutant would increase health risks in proportion to an individual’s base-
line risk. The survival function could be expressed as pi(G) = pi + (1 − pi)ε(G), with
0 ≤ ε(·) < 1, ε′(·) > 0, and ε′′(·) < 0.13
Remark 5. Under proportional risk reduction (pi(G) = pi + (1− pi)ε(G)) with homoge-
neous wealth and exogenous labor supply, if fear of ruin is weakly concave, the optimal level
of public safety is lower in the first-best than with uniform or income tax (G∗F < G∗U = G∗I).
13To see that this corresponds to a proportional risk reduction, consider the initial mortality risk
exposure xi = 1 − pi. Then pi(G) = 1 − xi(1 − ε(G)), where ε(G) indeed represents the reduction in
proportion of the risk exposure.
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The results in this section are closely related to those in Armantier and Treich (2004).
Most specifically, Armantier and Treich show in their Proposition 1 that, under uniform
taxation, there is over-provision of public safety under baseline risk heterogeneity while
there is under-provision under heterogeneous changes in risk. There are some differences
though with Armantier and Treich which explain why their results hold for all probability
and utility functions while our results can go either way depending on these functions.
First, Armantier and Treich only consider first-order approximations while our results
hold in the large. Second, the comparative statics exercise is slightly different. Indeed,
Armantier and Treich do not compare as we do here optimal public safety in the first-best
optimum and second-best optimum. Instead, they examine whether the net benefit of
an indivisible public safety project financed by uniform taxation, but evaluated by the
aggregate VSL method (as if the economy was at the first best optimum), is overestimated
or underestimated.
5 Distortionary Taxation
In this section, we focus on the distortionary aspect of imperfect taxation. The main
result of this section is an application of the general results in previous studies in public
economics.14 We assume that individuals are identical (so that we drop the individual
i’s index) and that they maximize their utility by choosing the consumption c and labor
supply l, subject to the tax rate. Because individuals are small compared to the size
of the economy, they do not take into account the feedback effect of taxation.15 With
identical individuals, the first-best is equivalent to uniform lump-sum taxation. Here,
income tax corresponds to the imperfect taxation case.
The social planner’s problems under first-best and income tax are respectively:
14Extensive research has been done on the issue of public good provision with distortionary tax (Atkin-
son and Stern 1974; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; Gaube 2000, 2005).
15Individuals take the level of public safety as given. That is, they do not take into consideration that






















s.t. GI = Hωl∗τ (τ)τ
(5.2)
{c∗t (t), l∗t (t)} and {c∗τ (τ), l∗τ (τ)} are the individual’s optimal choice bundles given the
















































where G∗F = Ht∗, G∗I = τ ∗wl∗τ (τ ∗), and εlτ∗ = ∂l∂τ /
l
τ
denotes the labor supply elasticity of
income tax.
Comparing equation 5.3 and 5.4, we can see that the ranking of G∗F and G∗I depends
on the properties of the utility function u(·), the individual’s optimal choice bundles given
t and τ , and the elasticity term εlτ∗ .
Proposition 2. Under distortionary tax with identical individuals, assume labor supply
is an inferior good, then a sufficient condition for the optimal level of public safety in the
first-best to be greater than that under income tax (G∗F = G∗U > G∗I) is to have a weakly
negative labor supply elasticity of income tax (εlτ ≤ 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Proposition 2 is very similar to Gaube (2000, Proposition 2). The meta-analysis on
labor supply elasticity conducted by Bargain and Peichl (2016) supports the assumptions
16
made in Proposition 2. They summarize over 90 studies that estimate labor supply
elasticity in Europe and US. The majority of studies estimate a positive uncompensated
labor supply elasticity of wage rate, which corresponds to εlτ < 0. Moreover, in these
studies, the income elasticity of labor generally has a negative sign, which is consistent
with the assumption that labor is an inferior good.




1. the labor effort is commensurable with consumption u(c, l) = v(c− e(l));
2. or the labor effort is separable from consumption u(c, l) = v(c) − e(l), and the
relative risk aversion of v(c) is less than 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Corollary 1 specifies two benchmark utility functional forms inducing a downward
sloping labor supply. This is when the substitution effect between consumption and
leisure always dominates the income effect, and less labor is provided when there is a
higher tax rate. Consequently, following Proposition 2, the first-best level of public safety
is always greater than under distortionary tax under these specific utility functions.
The results in this section also have implications on the marginal cost of public fund
(MCPF). From equations 5.3 and 5.4, we can define the MCPF = 1
1+εlτ∗
, which denotes
the distortion of income tax on labor supply.16 Depending on the sign of the labor supply
elasticity, the MCPF may be greater or lower than unity.
Proposition 2 shows that if the value of MCPF is greater than one, then the second-
best level of public safety is always lower than the first-best level. This is in line with
the Pigou conjecture. However, the proposition is not conclusive for the case where the
MCPF is lower than one. We can in fact show that this condition is not sufficient to induce
more public safety in the second-best. Consider a utility function u(c, l) = (1− l)e−e
c
1−l
and a survival function p(G) = a + (1 − a)(1 − e−bG), where a = 0.8 and b = 0.01.17
Assume there are H = 100 identical individuals. Given these specific functional forms,
G∗F = 297.6 and G∗I = 287.8. In this case, the MCPF = 0.65 with εlτ = 0.538.
16The expression of MCPF comes from rearranging equation 5.4 to fit the modified Samuelson’s rule
for distortionary taxation, where the sum of the marginal rate of substitution between the public good
and private consumption Hp
′(G)u
p(G)uc
equals to the marginal rate of transformation 1 multiplied by a term
usually denoted as MCPF.
17This utility function has the property of backward bending labor supply as shown in Hanoch (1965).
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6 Inequalities and Public Safety
As the World Inequality Report 2018 documents, wealth and income inequalities within
world regions vary greatly and have been increasing in nearly all countries since 1980
(Alvaredo et al. 2018). Moreover, several studies in the public health sector document
significant level of inequality in mortality risks caused by differences in both socioeconomic
status and health behaviors (Laaksonen et al. 2007; Mackenbach et al. 2008). In this
section, we ask: How do wealth and risk inequalities affect optimal public safety provision?
And to what extent does the relationship between inequality and optimal public safety
vary with tax system imperfections?
6.1 Wealth inequality
Here we consider the model in section 3, and we assume H = 2 where w1 = (1 + η)w̄,
w2 = (1 − η)w̄, with w̄ denoting the average wealth. Here η ∈ [0, 1) measures wealth
inequality with η = 0 indicating perfect equality.
Remark 6. Under homogeneous risk and exogenous labor supply, an increase in wealth
inequality does not affect the first-best optimal level of public safety, but reduces the optimal
safety level under uniform taxation if u′′′ ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Figure 2 illustrates Remark 6: in the first-best, increasing inequality does not affect
the optimal level of safety; under uniform tax, the level is monotonically decreasing with
increasing inequality. The first part of Remark 6 is analogous to the well known result
of private provision of public good: wealth redistribution among contributors does not
change the equilibrium supply of public good (Bergstrom et al. 1986).
Figure 2 also shows that with income taxation, increasing wealth inequality may
not monotonically change the optimal level of public safety. For example, with a specific
CARA utility function, increasing wealth inequality first decreases and then increases the
optimal level of public safety. If utility satisfies CRRA, given the result from Remark 2,
the optimal level of public safety remains unchanged regardless of the degree of inequality.
18












Note: Simulated in Mathematica. p(x) = 0.2 + 0.02x1+0.04x , CARA utility u(x) =
1−e−αx
α , α = 0.01 and
w = 1000.
6.2 Risk inequality
Here we consider the model in section 4, and we separately analyze the effect of baseline
risk inequality and risk reduction inequality. For baseline risk inequality, we set pb1(G) =
(1 + η)p̄ + ε(G) and pb2(G) = (1 − η)p̄ + ε(G). For risk reduction inequality, we set
pr1(G) = p + (1 + η)δ̄G and pr2(G) = p + (1 − η)δ̄G. As before, η denotes the degree of
inequality and η ∈ [0, 1).
Remark 7. Under homogeneous wealth and exogenous labor supply, an increase in risk
inequality (both baseline risk and risk reduction) does not affect the optimal level of public
safety under uniform and income tax.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
The simulations show that in the first-best, however, increasing risk inequality affects
the optimal public safety level and magnifies the gap between the level in the first-best
and under uniform taxation. Figure 3 shows the optimal safety level with respect to the
baseline risk inequality and risk reduction inequality.
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Figure 3 Effect of risk inequality on the optimal safety level
First- Best
Uniform Tax
















































Note: Simulated in Mathematica. pi(x) = pi + 0.02x1+0.04x , p1 = (1 + η)p̄, p2 = (1 − η)p̄, p̄ = 0.25, CARA
utility u(x) = 1−e−αxα , α = 0.02, CRRA utility u(x) =
x1−γ
1−γ , γ = 0.5 and w = 1000.
7 Policy Implications
In this section, we discuss some implications for policies and for their economic evaluation.
We discuss how to adjust BCA, and thus the VSL approach, to account for imperfect
taxation. Specifically, we show that imperfect taxation can be accounted for in BCA by
applying distributional weights to VSLs, and we illustrate the impact of this adjustment
with an evaluation of the COVID-19 prevention policy. We also discuss how to adjust
the VSL transfer method and the use of the MCPF concept.
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7.1 VSL and distributional weights under imperfect taxation
In practice, several policy-making agencies that implement public safety projects, e.g.
the U.S. EPA and the U.S. DOT, commonly use the VSL to monetize mortality risk
reduction benefit. The recommended VSL is usually obtained from meta-analysis of VSL
estimates from stated or revealed preferences studies (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 2016b), and is often interpreted as a population average of individual VSLs.
Recall from section 2 that the efficient condition to achieve optimality in public safety




















, which equates the average VSL to the social marginal cost of
saving a life. Therefore, average VSL can determine the optimal level of public safety if
taxation is perfect and p′i(G∗) is independent of V SLi. In the absence of either conditions,
however, the average VSL can lead to an over- or under-valuation of the social value of
public safety. One way to address this concern in practice is to incorporate “distributional
weights” into BCA (Adler 2016).
Currently, the official guidelines for BCA in the UK recommend using distributional
weights that can be expressed as the marginal utility of each quintile as a percentage of
average marginal utility (Her Majesty’s Treasury 2003). However, this weighting scheme
only accounts for income inequalities and does not consider other inequalities, such as risk
inequality. Moreover, it does not explicitly address the question of imperfect taxation.
In the following, we present a simple exercise of re-expressing the optimality conditions
under imperfect taxation in terms of a weighted VSL and discuss the weighting rules.





i(G)V SLi = 1, (7.1)
where λi is the corresponding weight assigned to each individual. The weights vary with
the tax systems and sources of heterogeneity. Table 3 shows the weights in each case.18
The Table shows that there is not one set of weights that can be applied to all taxation
cases. In the first-best, no weight is needed as redistribution is fully taken care of through
18The distributional weights for the wealth heterogeneity case are obtained by rearranging equations
3.5 and 3.6. The weights for the risk heterogeneity case are obtained by rearranging the focs of 4.2 for
the H individuals case. These computations are straightforward and left to the readers.
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Table 3 VSL weights under different taxation systems and heterogeneities

































taxation. In the case of wealth heterogeneity, under uniform tax, the weights are similar








tax, the weights can be expressed as the individual marginal utility over the sum of wealth
weighted ( wk∑
j wj
) marginal utilities. Moreover, under risk heterogeneity with uniform and
income taxation, the weights should be the individual survival probability as a percentage










To illustrate how VSL changes when using distributional weights, we calibrate the
weights under uniform taxation for both wealth and risk heterogeneity using U.S. data.
In turn, we compare the average and the weighted level of VSLs. Table 4 exhibits the
parameters used for the calibration exercise. We take the average income in the top and
bottom quartile of the US population in the age group of 40 to construct a “rich” and a
“poor” group. Similarly, we take the all inclusive mortality risk in the age group 40-44
to construct a “risky” and a “safe” group.19
19According to the National Vital Statistics Reports of U.S. CDC, within the age group of 40-44, the
Non-hispanic American or Alaska Native has the highest number of death per 10 thousand people. The
Non-hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander has the lowest number of death per 10 thousand people. We take
the death rate of these two groups as the high and low mortality risk, respectively.
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Table 4 Parameters used to calibrate the distributional weights
Parameters Description Source Value
yrich average annual income for people, age 40, top 25% U.S. Census Bureau $80,400
ypoor average annual income for people, age 40, bottom 25% U.S. Census Bureau $27,509
ymedian median annual income for people, age 40 U.S. Census Bureau $47,529
rmedian average all inclusive mortality risk, age 40-44 U.S. CDC 0.0022
rrisky average all inclusive mortality risk, age 40-44, high risk U.S. CDC 0.0047
rsafe average all inclusive mortality risk, age 40-44, low risk U.S. CDC 0.0008
T average life expectancy for people of age 40 U.S. CDC 40
i interest rate 1%
V SL population average VSL U.S. EPA $9,700,000
Note: The mortality risk data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S. CDC) is
found in Kochanek et al. (2019).
We assume that individuals have CRRA utility of the form u(w) = w1−γ
1−γ . Since
we do not observe the level of risk aversion, we calibrate the parameter γ such that
the average population VSL matches that of the EPA recommended level of 9.7 million






. The calibrated degree of relative risk aversion is shown in
Table 5.
Table 5 Calibrated degree of relative risk aversion
γ Description Value
γwealth for wealth heterogeneity 0.8114
γrisk for risk heterogeneity 0.8338
Note: γwealth is calibrated using the rich and poor life time discounted wealth and the median mortality
risk. γrisk is calibrated using the median life time discounted wealth with the risky and safe mortality
risk.
We then calculate the pre-tax distributional weights based on the formulas in Table
3 and compare the averages and weighted level of VSL.20 Table 6 displays the result.
The top half of the table shows the wealth heterogeneity case. We can see that under
uniform taxation, the poor are assigned a higher weight than the rich. Thus, the weighted
20 The weights are calibrated only for the uniform tax case. Indeed, with CRRA utility, the optimal
safety level under income tax and the first-best are always the same under wealth heterogeneity, as
demonstrated in Remark 2. For risk heterogeneity, income tax is equivalent to uniform tax.
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VSL under uniform tax is lower than the unweighted level, which indicates that, if the
underlying public finance for a safety project was a uniform tax, using the average VSL
would result in over-provision of public safety.
Similarly, the bottom half of Table 6 shows the risk heterogeneity case. Under uniform
taxation, the safe are assigned a higher weight. The weighted VSL is lower than the
average VSL, although to a very small extent due to the relatively small difference between
the initial risk level of the two groups.
Table 6 Calibrated distributional weights and VSLs
VSL Distributional Weights (λ)
Rich $14,455,492 0.590
Poor $494,597 1.410
Average (weighted) VSL $9,700,731 $7,753,248
Risky $9,721,552 0.998
Safe $9,691,367 1.002
Average (weighted) VSL $9,706,459 $9,706,436
7.2 Illustrative example – COVID-19
We now illustrate the analysis of the optimal level of public safety provision with the
example of policy interventions in the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the pandemic, the
mortality risk increased significantly in 2020 and led to the implementation of social
distancing and lock-down rules to contain the spread of the virus. Here we simulate how
stringent the social distancing rules should be, depending on how the economic cost is
shared between different population cohorts.
Individuals face a general mortality risk r0i and a COVID-19 specific mortality risk
rci. We assume that social distancing rules decrease rci but do not affect r0i. Imposing
social distancing rules G would incur an economic cost measured by percentage of GDP.
The survival function pi(G) is concave in G.We take the example of the US. Following
Adler (2020), we divide the individuals into seven age groups ranging from 20 to above
80. Within each age group there are four income groups divided by quartiles. Altogether
there are 28 cohorts of individuals. The income and risk levels for each cohort are shown
in the tables below.
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Table 7 Annual income by age group and income quartile
Income ($) 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
1st 16005 26023 28488 29021 29277 28378 27002
2nd 27757 44756 49645 50334 50193 48404 47170
3rd 43458 71927 81126 84393 85651 85440 79041
4th 63262 110391 131646 140525 142882 157759 129139
Data source: U.S. Census Bureau
Table 8 Lifetime income by age group and income quartile
Life time income (million $) 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
1st 1.151 1.058 0.892 0.700 0.341 0.341 0.258
2nd 1.976 1.825 1.531 1.201 0.588 0.588 0.451
3rd 3.294 3.077 2.611 2.071 1.020 1.020 0.756
4th 5.416 5.149 4.447 3.574 1.742 1.742 1.235
Note: The lifetime income is computed using wi =
∑Ti−ti
k=0 β
kyi,ti+k, where Ti is the life expectancy, ti
is the current age, β = 11+r is the discount factor, yi,ti+k is the income level at age ti + k. We assume
that individuals remain in their income quartile throughout their life and the discount rate r is taken at
1%. The life expectancy data is taken from U.S. CDC.
Table 9 General and COVID-19 risk by age group
Age group risk (%) 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
General risk 0.1087 0.1594 0.2674 0.6140 1.2437 2.7377 9.8789
COVID-19 risk 0.0240 0.0650 0.1220 0.4860 1.7820 4.1310 7.5330
Data source: General risk data are obtained from U.S. CDC; COVID-19 risk data are taken from Adler
(2020)’s Table 2. The COVID-19 mortality risk is defined as the mortality risk in the absence of any
government intervention, which would result in 80% of the population contracting the virus.
We calibrate the utility function and survival function using the above mentioned
data. The specific functional forms are shown in Table 10.
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Table 10 Calibrated function and parameter values
Functional form Parameter Value
Utility function u(ci) = c
1−γ
i
1−γ γ = 0.7902
Survival function pi(G) = 1− r0i − rcie−αG α = −3.27171
Note: γ is calibrated using the life time income level and general mortality risk, such that the population
average VSL equals to the recommended VSL of EPA, which amounts to 9.7 million USD. Following
Acemoglu et al. (2020), we calibrate a concave survival function such that a 37.5% (resp. 10%) decrease
in GDP reduces the average mortality risk from COVID-19 to 0.2% (resp. 1.05%). The calibration is
done using least square method to fit the exponential survival probability function to the data points.
Following Adler (2020), GDP is measured by the population weighted sum of individual income in the
current year. The population weight is obtained from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey,
“Age and Sex Tables,” Table 1.
We simulate the optimal cost incurred by social distancing given different cost sharing
schemes. To be consistent with the theoretical modelling, we consider three cases, optimal
cost sharing (first-best), uniform cost sharing (uniform), and proportional cost sharing
(income). Table 11 shows the optimal level of social distancing costs given different cost
sharing schemes as well as the corresponding distributional weighted VSL.
Table 11 Optimal social distancing rules given different cost sharing schemes
First-best Uniform Income
Optimal policy (% of GDP reduction) 51.65% 33.41% 47.61%
Weighted VSL ($) 9,608,700 6,056,900 9,606,300
Note: The weighted VSL is average VSL with cohort specific distributional weights. The distributional
weights are defined by equation 7.1 and we consider post-policy weights. In the uniform case, λi can be ex-
pressed as λi,uni = pi(GU )u
′(yi−tU )∑
j θjpj(GU )u







The results show that if the economic cost of social distancing is shared evenly across
individuals (i.e., in the uniform case), then the social distancing rules should be relaxed
by about one-third compared to the first-best cost sharing case. Similarly, the distribu-
tional weighted VSL in the uniform case is also reduced by about one-third compared to
the population VSL in the first-best. Note finally that there is evidence that the more
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economically vulnerable workers are more likely to be affected by social distancing poli-
cies (Mongey et al. 2020). Hence, although the uniform case can be viewed in general as
an extreme form of imperfect taxation, it may not be a bad approximation for the cost
sharing rule of the COVID-19 early prevention policies.
7.3 VSL transfer
VSL is used in BCA for a variety of policy evaluations. However, it is costly to conduct
case-specific VSL studies. Thus, a common practice is to take the VSL value in some case
studies and quantitatively adjust the value to fit the policy context, known as “benefit
transfers” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2011). A common practice is to adjust
VSL by the income elasticity of the populations under study (Hammitt and Robinson
2011). Our analysis suggests that, in addition to income elasticity, which accounts for
the wealth differences across populations, the population wealth and risk inequalities as
well as tax system imperfections also need to be considered.
Meta-analyses of wage-risk studies have shown that the VSL estimates of developed
countries (e.g. U.S., UK) can be more than ten times the estimates of middle-income
countries (e.g. China) (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Moreover, the extrapolated VSL under
income adjustment for low-income countries (e.g. Kenya, Ethiopia) could be 50 times
lower than that of the U.S. (Hammitt and Robinson 2011). Although these values already
raise controversy, we argue there are two reasons to even further adjust these estimates:
the inequality of wealth and risk as well as the imperfection in the taxation systems. In
particular, Proposition 1 indicates that imperfect taxation justifies lower public safety.
Remarks 6 and 7 show that a higher degree of wealth or mortality risk inequalities may
also call for a lower safety provision.
7.4 The marginal cost of public funds
The marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) measures the loss incurred by raising ad-
ditional revenues to finance government spending. However, no consensus has yet been
reached on the value of MCPF (Dahlby 2008). In practice, agencies adopt different values
of MCPF in their guidelines for BCA, but they are usually greater than unity. For ex-
ample, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommends using an MCPF
of 1.25 (Office of Management and Budget 1992, article 11), the European Union uses
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a default MCPF of 1 in the absence of national guidelines (Florio et al. 2008) while the
French government recommends using a median value of 1.2 (Quinet 2013).21
We show in section 5 that the MCPF can theoretically be greater or lower than unity
depending on the labor supply elasticity. Empirical evidence suggests that the MCPF
is larger than unity.22 However, the BCA practice of accounting for tax distortions only
through MCPF on the cost side appears insufficient to determine the optimal level of
public safety provision. This is because distortionary taxation also affects the marginal
benefit of public safety (see the LHS of equation 5.4).23 Even if the MCPF is lower than
unity, which implies a lower marginal cost of providing public safety, the optimal public
safety in the second-best may still be lower than in the first-best due to the impact of
distortionary taxation on the marginal benefit.
8 Conclusion
It is well known that BCA focuses on efficiency. It rests on the Kaldor-Hicks concept,
which measures the (unweighted) sum of individuals’ willingness to pay for a project.
However, it is also well known that a project that does pass the BCA test may fail to
increase social welfare if its financing is sub-optimal. In the practice of policy evaluation,
a “common belief” is that the imperfections in the taxation system should decrease the
social value of a costly project. This belief is reminiscent of Pigou’s famous conjecture
that distortionary taxation should induce a lower provision of the public good. Our main
objective in this paper is to examine formally this common belief in the context of public
safety provision.
A central result in our paper is Proposition 1. Confirming the common belief, this
result shows that an (imperfect) uniform tax reduces the level of optimal public safety
21There are two competing approaches to the MCPF, namely the Dasgupta-Stiglitz-Atkinson-Stern
(DSAS) tradition, and the Pigou-Harberger-Browning (PHB) tradition (Dahlby 2008). Our analysis
follows the DSAS approach, where the social planner’s budget is balanced.
22Although it is a theoretical possibility in accordance with Atkinson and Stern (1974) that the income
effect may dominate the substitution effect resulting in a positive labor supply elasticity, there is little
empirical evidence of such occurrence (Meghir and Phillips 2010). However, Manski (2014) argues that
the consensus in the empirical literature may be an artifact of the strong assumptions made in the models.
He states that without the knowledge of income-leisure preference, one cannot predict how labor effort
may change with the tax rate (Manski 2014, p.147) .
23This is due to the non-separability between public safety and private consumption. If the public
good and private consumption were separable, distortionary tax would have no effect on the marginal
benefit of public good. See (e.g.) Atkinson and Stern (1974) for the analysis of the separable case.
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compared to a first best lump-sum tax. The intuition is the following. First, the marginal
cost of safety provision is higher under imperfect taxation because the tax burden on the
poor is greater. Second, the marginal benefit is lower because imperfect taxation lowers
the average utility in the society, and thus lowers the social value of saving a life. However,
the rest of the theoretical analysis presents a much more complex picture. Indeed, we
show that imperfect taxation may in fact increase, and not decrease, safety provision
if imperfect taxation takes the form of an income tax or if the heterogeneity concerns
individuals’ mortality risks. Therefore, we must add a word of caution, and recognize
that public safety need not decrease in general under imperfect taxation.
Moreover, the paper develops some preliminary numerical analyses. When we cali-
brate the distributional weights for imperfect taxation, we find that the weighted VSL
should be lower by between 0% to 20%. In our illustrative analysis of the COVID-19 early
prevention policy, the induced weighted VSL should be reduced by about one-third un-
der uniform cost sharing compared to the first-best case. Our simulations also show that
wealth inequality supports less safety provision under imperfect taxation. Furthermore,
when we study the impact of distortionary taxation, we find that public safety should be
reduced under a negative labor supply elasticity of the income tax, an assumption which
is relatively well supported empirically. Overall, we thus suggest that the VSL should in
general be adjusted downwards because of imperfect taxation. Further empirical studies
are needed however to estimate more precisely the size of this adjustment.
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A Appendix
A.1 Second order conditions
For the general framework, we assume that the second order conditions (socs) are satisfied.
For the wealth heterogeneity and distortionary taxation case, the socs of the social
planner’s problems (3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.3, and 5.4) are always satisfied under the assumptions
made.
For the risk heterogeneity case, the socs of the uniform and income tax problem
(4.2, 4.3) are always satisfied. For the first-best (4.1), in order to have the socs sat-
isfied, the Hessian of 4.1 need to be negative definite. Denoting f(t∗1, t∗2) ≡ p1(t∗1 +





























∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0. The first two conditions are easy to show. For the last
condition, denote: A1 = p′′1u1, A2 = p′′2u2, B1 = p′1u′1, B2 = p′2u′2, C1 = p1u′′1, C2 = p2u′′2. If
(A1 +A2)(C1 +C2)− (B1 −B2)2 − 2B1C2 − 2B2C1 +C1C2 > 0, then the soc is satisfied
globally.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Under wealth heterogeneity with homogeneous risk and exogenous labor
supply, with u′′′(x) ≥ 0, the optimal level of public safety in the first-best is higher than
that with uniform taxation (G∗F > G∗U).
Proof. The focs of the first-best and uniform tax maximization problems equalize the
marginal benefit of public safety to its marginal cost of provision. Thus equations 3.4



























The left-hand side (LHS) for both equations A.1 and A.2 corresponds to the marginal
benefit and the right-hand side (RHS) corresponds to the marginal cost. Observe that for
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any given level of G =
∑H











and under prudence u′′′ ≥ 0, we have
H∑
i=1







Therefore, for the same level of G, the LHS of equation A.1 is greater than that of A.2
and the RHS of A.1 is lower than that of A.2. As Figure 1 illustrates, under risk aversion
and prudence, we must have G∗F > G∗U at the optimum.
A.3 Proof of Remark 2
Remark 2. Under wealth heterogeneity with homogeneous risk and exogenous labor
supply, if the utility function satisfies CRRA, then the optimal level of public safety in
the first-best is always the same as that with income taxation (G∗F = G∗I).




































































F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
×
u(w − t∗1)− u(w − t∗2)




































u′(w − t∗U)︸ ︷︷ ︸
U∗Uni
(A.7)
Again, we are interested in comparing G∗F and G∗U . As the LHS of equations A.5 and
A.7 are of the same form and are increasing functions of G, we only need to examine the
RHS of the equations.










weakly convex, U∗FB ≥ ÛUni. Given our assumptions on the functional forms, we know
that A > 0 and B > 0. Thus the ranking of G∗F and G∗U depends on the sign of C. If












, the RHS of A.5 is greater than the RHS of A.7 when











a sufficient condition for the RHS of A.5 to be lower than A.7 is fear of ruin weakly
concave (U∗FB ≤ ÛUni). In this case, t∗U > t̂U and G∗U > G∗F .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. Under distortionary tax with identical individuals, assume labor supply
is an inferior good, then a sufficient condition for the optimal level of public safety in the
first-best to be greater than that under income tax (G∗F = G∗U > G∗I) is to have a weakly
negative labor supply elasticity of income tax (εlτ ≤ 0).
Proof. Equation 5.3 gives the implicit value of G∗F . Take ĜI = G∗F , we can con-










(1 + εlτ̂ ) ⋛ 1, then we can conclude about the ranking between G∗F
































I if εlτ̂ < FRtFRτ − 1
≤ G∗I if εlτ̂ ≥ FRtFRτ − 1

















We show that for a lump-sum tax and an income tax that obtains the same level of
tax revenue, the fear of ruin under the lump-sum tax is strictly higher than under the
income tax, FRt > FRτ , if labor is an inferior good. To compare FRt and FRτ , we
show that u(c∗t (t∗), l∗t (t∗)) > u(c∗τ (τ̂), l∗τ (τ̂)) and uc(c∗t (t∗), l∗t (t∗)) < uc(c∗τ (τ̂), l∗τ (τ̂)). Given
the same level of tax revenue, it is obvious that the lump-sum tax can achieve a strictly
higher utility level than the income tax (u(c∗t (t∗), l∗t (t∗)) > u(c∗τ (τ̂), l∗τ (τ̂))). It is easy to
show that for the same level of tax revenue, c∗t (t∗) > c∗τ (τ̂) and l∗t (t∗) > l∗τ (τ̂). Taking the
full derivative of uc we get
duc = uccdc+ ucldl = (wucc + ucl)dl (A.9)
The last equality is obtained by substituting dc = ωdl from the budget constraint. There-
fore, uc(c∗t (t∗), l∗t (t∗)) < uc(c∗τ (τ̂), l∗τ (τ̂)) iff ucl + ωucc < 0. From the foc of the individual
utility maximization in the first-best, we have F (l, t) = uc(c∗t , l∗t )ω + ul(c∗t , l∗t ) = 0. Using


















We know that the denominator must be negative so that the second-order condition
is satisfied. Thus, if labor is an inferior (normal) good, the numerator is negative









τ (τ̂)), and FRt > FRτ .
Thus, FRt
FRτ
− 1 > 0. A sufficient condition for G∗F > G∗I is to have εlτ ≤ 0.
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A.6 Proof of Corollary 1




1. the labor effort is commensurable with consumption u(c, l) = v(c− e(l));
2. or the labor effort is separable from consumption u(c, l) = v(c) − e(l), and the
relative risk aversion of v(c) is less than 1.

















By assumption, e′′(l) > 0, then ∂l
∗(τ)
∂τ∗
< 0 which implies εlτ∗ < 0.
We can also check that labor is an inferior good under commensurable labor effort:
ucl + wucc = v
′′ × (w − e′(l)) < 0, since e′(l) = w(1− τ) and v′′(·) < 0.




v′′(c∗(τ))w2l∗(1− τ) + v′(c∗(τ))w
v′′(c∗(τ))w2(1− τ)2 − e′′(l∗(τ))
(A.12)
By assumption, the denominator is negative. In this case, if the relative risk aver-
sion coefficient R(c∗(τ)) = −c∗(τ)v
′′(c∗(τ))
v′(c∗(τ))
< 1, then the numerator of the RHS of
equation A.12 is positive, which implies εlτ∗ < 0.
Labor is indeed an inferior good under separable labor effort: ucl+wucc = wv′′(c) <
0.
We can easily conclude with Proposition 2 that G∗F > G∗I under the assumptions of 1 and
2.
A.7 Proof of Remark 6
Remark 6. Under homogeneous risk and exogenous labor supply, an increase in wealth
inequality does not affect the first-best optimal level of public safety, but reduces the optimal
safety level under uniform taxation if u′′′ ≥ 0.
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Proof. In the first-best, the optimal level of taxation is characterized by (1 + η)w̄− t∗1 =
(1 − η)w̄ − t∗2 from equation 3.4 when H = 2. A change in wealth inequality can be
expressed as η′ = η + ∆η. The optimality condition gives (1 + η + ∆η)w̄ − T ∗1 = (1 −
η −∆η)w̄ − T ∗2 . Thus, it is straightforward that t∗1 = T ∗1 −∆ηw̄ and t∗2 = T ∗2 +∆ηw̄. It
follows that T ∗1 + T ∗2 = t∗1 + t∗2.
For uniform taxation, we can rewrite equation 3.5 as a function of η:
F (t∗U , η) ≡ p(2t∗U)(u′1 + u′2)− 2p′(2t∗U)(u1 + u2) = 0 (A.13)
where u1 = u((1 + η)w̄ − t∗U) and u2 = u((1− η)w̄ − t∗U). Applying the implicit function












< 0 if u′′′ ≥ 0. Therefore, assuming
prudence, t∗U decreases in η.
A.8 Proof of Remark 7
Remark 7. Under homogeneous wealth and exogenous labor supply, an increase in risk
inequality (both baseline risk and risk reduction) does not affect the optimal level of public
safety under uniform and income tax.







As the foc of uniform tax is independent of η, GU (and equivalently GI) remains constant
regardless of η.
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